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ABSTRACT: In the last years, the fiscal harmonization among the European Union 
members has become a pillar of economic integration and of fiscal and financial stability in 
the European area. The institutional changes, the semi-failure of the “old” Stability and 
Growth Pact as well as the recent waves of enlargements all these were put a greater 
emphasis on this issue inducing a higher pressure for fiscal discipline. 
In this context, the objective of the paper is to examines recent empirical evidences for 
bilateral and multilateral integration between fiscal policies, as this are synthesised by 
budget deficits, of old European Union members in the framework of the Johansen co-
integration procedure with a preliminary appliance of the principal component analysis. The 
study finds that the dynamic of European fiscal policies takes place under the impact of some 
common driving forces which leads to a differentiate behaviour of two sub regional-groups 
individualized by the budget deficit series evolutionary patterns. Overall, it concludes that 
there could be find empirical evidences to support the thesis that a process of fiscal 
integration is currently running at least at the level of old European Union countries. 
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1. Introduction 
 
As Prohl and Schneider (2006, 2) noticed “In recent years, growing attention is paid to fiscal 
sustainability in Europe. Both, the debt and the deficit criteria, which are defined in the 
Maastricht Treaty, and the Stability and Growth Pact, are relevant to ensure the sustainability 
and stabilization of the public finance in the European Union (EU) member countries”. Also 
as de Córdoba and Torres (2007, 2) argues” Fiscal harmonization for the European Union 
member states is a goal that encounters major difficulties for its implementation. Each country 
faces a particular trade-off between fiscal revenues generated by taxation and the productive 
efficiency loss induced by the tax code”. The results of such trade-offs takes a special content 
in the context of the actual architecture of European Union. 
 
There are several possible arguments for the existence of long-run relationships between 
fiscal policies of the old European Union members as this are synthesised by budget deficits. 
A minimal list of such arguments could include: 
 
1) The fiscal criteria of the Maastricht Treaty and the Stability Pact effects 
The Maastricht Treaty with its guideline philosophy of “Member States shall avoid excessive 
government deficits” and with the Protocol specification of “3% for the ratio of the planned or 
actual government deficit to gross domestic product at market prices” and respectively “60% 
for the ratio of government debt to gross domestic product at market prices” was established, 
at least theoretically, a common ceil on fiscal expansion for the European Union members and 
was imposed a sort of maximal reference for the fiscal discipline. 
Also the Stability Pact set out to prevent one country from borrowing excessively at the 
expense of others, contributing to ensure the financial stability in the euro area. But from our 
point of view it is not yet clear what kind of effects will be induced by the “new” Pact of 
March 2005 with the differentiated “medium-term objectives”(MTO), the new provisions 
concerning the adjustment effort that should be made in order to reach the MTO, the fact that 
both the MTOs and the adjustment path towards them will be measured in cyclically adjusted 
terms and with “exceptional circumstances” clause, the taking into account of  a long and 
detailed list of “other relevant factors” when assessing whether a deficit above 3% of GDP is 
excessive and with the specification that the initial deadline for correcting an excessive deficit  
should be set such that a minimum fiscal adjustment of 0.5% of GDP per annum is required. 
 
2) The automatic responses of government budget balances to the business cycle 
This argument could be formulated as follows:  if a) the fiscal policy is based on 
countercyclical reactions and if b) the economic integration leads at the manifestation in the 
European Union of some common economic development trends than the budget deficits are 
moving together under the impact of cross-countries economic environment determinants. 
The countercyclical case of fiscal policy is perhaps most clearly resumed by Alesina and 
Perotti (1995) which are arguing that that during episodes of energetic fiscal policy behaviour, 
governments make atypical choices between taxes and public investment, on the one hand, 
and public consumption and transfers, on the other. During major expansions, politicians 
predominantly raise consumption and transfers, while during vigorous consolidation they 
raise taxes and limit investment. But it should be noticed that the empirical support for this 
thesis is still controversial (see for an example Mélitz (2000)).  
 
3) The fiscal and monetary coordination 
The creation of EMU was raising a set of concerns about the coordination of fiscal and 
monetary policies since potentially the existence of the single monetary policy could 
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substantially alter discretionary fiscal behaviour. Also a more permissive fiscal policy should 
be counterbalanced by a more tightly monetary policy. But as Mélitz (2000, 2) noticed “there 
is no support for the pessimistic view that monetary policy accommodates loose fiscal policy. 
The tightening of fiscal policy in response to easier monetary policy, in turn, results entirely 
from spending behaviour. Taxes do not contribute at all”. Even this position is accepted in a 
“weaker” version still it could be argued that in a sense or other the autonomous fiscal 
policies should have a common type of reactions to the changes in the single monetary policy. 
 
4) The less” ideological” nature of fiscal policy 
The conception and the appliance of fiscal policies in European Countries (as well as in the 
developed non-European ones) tends to be rather “pragmatic” than “ideological”. This implies 
that the structure of public expenditures is more willing to respond to economic and social 
similar objectives with less attention paid to the shifting in the public power doctrinal 
orientation. And of course, Brussels’ over national structures are a strong supportive 
determinant of such “pragmatic” approach.   
Such factors (and, of course, many others) explains why different studies, such as Prohl and 
Schneider (2006), finds that the deficit- and the debt-GDP ratios are co-integrated (for this 
study, the conclusion stands for France, Germany, Luxembourg, Portugal, Sweden, and the 
UK). Similar conclusions are reached in Alfonso (2005). 
 
In this context, the objective of this paper is to provide some empirical evidences for the 
existence of long-run relationships between fiscal policies of old European Union members, 
policies which are captured by the evolutions of budget deficits.  
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the involved methodology while Section 
3 discusses the data and the empirical results. Section 4 provides the concluding remarks and 
some possible further research directions. 
 
2. Methodology 
 
The co-integration among the old European Union old members’ fiscal policies synthesised 
by the budget deficit to GDP ratios is analysed in two stages. First, a preliminary principal 
component analysis is applied in order to identify the possible grouping configuration 
between different possible “fiscal families”. Second, pairwise Johansen co-integration tests 
are conducted to examine the long-run relations established among the considered set of 
countries. 
 
2.1. Principal component analysis 
 
Principal components analysis models the variance structure of a set of observed variables 
using linear combinations of the variables. These linear combinations, or components, may be 
used in subsequent analysis, and the combination coefficients, or loadings, may be used in 
interpreting the components.  
 
The principal components of a set of variables are obtained by computing the eigenvalue 
decomposition of the observed variance matrix. The first principal component is the unit-
length linear combination of the original variables with maximum variance. Subsequent 
principal components maximize variance among unit-length linear combinations that are 
orthogonal to the previous components. 
From the singular value decomposition, a ( )nxp  data matrix Y  of rank r could be represented 
as: 
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where  U  and V   are orthonormal matrices of the left and right singular vectors, and D   is a 
diagonal matrix containing the singular values. 
More generally, one could write: 
 
( )2'ABY =  
 
where A is an  ( )nxr , and  B  is a ( )pxr   matrix, both of rank r  , and 
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so that 10 ≤≤ α   is a factor which adjusts the relative weighting of the left (observations) and 
right (variables) singular vectors, and the terms involving β  are scaling factors where 
{ }αβ ,0∈ . 
The basic options in computing the scores A  and the corresponding loadings B involve the 
choice of (loading) weight parameter α   and (observation) scaling parameter β . 
In the principal components context, let ∑  be the cross-product moment (dispersion) 
matrix of  Y  , and let perform the eigenvalue decomposition: 
 
( )∑ Λ= 4'LL  
 
where L  is the  pxp  matrix of eigenvectors and Λ  is the diagonal matrix with eigenvalues 
on the diagonal. The eigenvectors, which are given by the columns of L , are identified up to 
the choice of sign. It could be observed the facts that since the eigenvectors are by 
construction orthogonal, mILLLL ==
''
. 
There could be done some settings as ( )211 ,, Λ=== − nDLVYLDU , so that: 
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.  
A  could be interpreted as the weighted principal components scores, and B  as the weighted 
principal components loadings.  
Others detail of this procedure concerns an appropriate choice of the weight parameter α  and 
the scaling parameter β  through which different scores and loadings with various properties 
could be constructed. 
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2.2. The Johansen co-integration test 
 
A further analytical step consists in taking into account the possible inter-linkages between 
the markets. This could be done based on a JOHANSEN co-integration test able to capture the 
“co-movements” between two or more non-stationary series. More exactly, Engle and 
Granger [1987] pointed out that a linear combination of two or more non-stationary series 
may be stationary. If such a stationary linear combination exists, the non-stationary time 
series are said to be co-integrated. The stationary linear combination is called the co-
integrating equation and may be interpreted as a “long-run” equilibrium relationship among 
the variables. To test for the existence of such co-integrating relationships between the indices 
we will employ the methodology developed in Johansen (1991, 1995). 
 
Thus lets consider ty  a k -vector of non-stationary I(1) variables, tx  a d  - vector of 
deterministic variables, and tε  a vector of innovations. Then the data generating process for 
ty y is a Gaussian vector autoregressive model of finite order k, VAR (k) which could be write 
as: 
 
( )61
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1 ttt
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− ∑  
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( )7,
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Granger’s representation theorem asserts that if the coefficient matrix Π  has reduced rank 
kr < , then there exist kxr   matrices α  and β  each with rank   such that 'αβ=Π   and 
ty
'β is I(0). r  is the number of co-integrating relations (the co-integrating rank) and each 
column of β   is the co-integrating vector. The elements of α   are known as the adjustment 
parameters in the VEC model. Johansen’s method is to estimate the Π   matrix from an 
unrestricted VAR and to test whether one can reject the restrictions implied by the reduced 
rank of Π  . 
The empirical time series may have nonzero means and deterministic trends as well as 
stochastic trends. Similarly, the co-integrating equations may have intercepts and 
deterministic trends. The asymptotic distribution of the LR test statistic for co-integration 
does not have the usual 2χ  distribution and depends on the assumptions made with respect to 
deterministic trends. Therefore, in order to carry out the test, one needs to make an 
assumption regarding the trend underlying the analysis data. 
 
Usually, these assumptions imply the following five deterministic trend cases considered by 
Johansen (1995, p. 80–84): 
1. The level data  ty  have no deterministic trends and the co-integrating equations do not 
have intercepts: 
( )81'1 −− =+Π ttt yBxy αβ  
 
2. The level data ty   have no deterministic trends and the co-integrating equations have 
intercepts:  
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 ( ) ( )901'1 ρβα +=+Π −− ttt yBxy  
 
3. The level data ty   have linear trends but the co-integrating equations have only intercepts:  
 ( ) ( )10001'1 γαρβα ⊥−− ++=+Π ttt yBxy  
 
4. The level data ty   and the co-integrating equations have linear trends:  
 ( ) ( )110101'1 γαρρβα ⊥−− +++=+Π tyBxy ttt  
 
5. The level data ty   have quadratic trends and the co-integrating equations have linear trends: 
 ( ) ( ) ( )1210101'1 ttyBxy ttt γγαρρβα ++++=+Π ⊥−−  
 
The terms associated with ⊥α  are the deterministic terms “outside” the co-integrating 
relations. When a deterministic term appears both inside and outside the co-integrating 
relation, the decomposition is not uniquely identified. Johansen (1995) identifies the part that 
belongs inside the error correction term by orthogonally projecting the exogenous terms onto 
the α space so that ⊥α   is the null space of α   such that  0
'
=⊥αα  .  
 
In order to estimate the number of co-integration relationships, two tests could be employed: 
The trace statistic tests the null hypothesis of  r  co-integrating relations against the 
alternative of k co-integrating relations, where k   is the number of endogenous variables, for 
1,...1,0 −= kr  . The alternative of k  co-integrating relations corresponds to the case where 
none of the series has a unit root and a stationary VAR may be specified in terms of the levels 
of all of the series. The trace statistic for the null hypothesis of   co-integrating relations is 
computed as: 
( ) ( ) ( )131logk|
1
∑
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−−=
k
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where iλ  is the thi − largest eigenvalue of the Π  matrix. 
The maximum eigenvalue statistic tests the null hypothesis of r   co-integrating relations 
against the alternative of 1+r   co-integrating relations. This test statistic is computed as: 
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3. Data and empirical results 
 
Data consists on quarterly budget deficit values for 14 European Union old members’ 
countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, 
Luxemburg, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom (in order to ensure the data 
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homogeneity and completeness the case of Portugal was excluded) from Quarterly Summary 
Government Finance Statistics template tables, Eurostat 2008.  
The choice of data frequency was based on Blanchard and Perotti (1999,2) argument:” with 
enough institutional information about the tax and transfer systems and the timing of tax 
collections, one can construct estimates of the automatic effects of unexpected movements in 
activity on fiscal variables, and, by implication, obtain estimates of fiscal policy shocks”.  
 
Of course, we are aware of the counter-arguments which make a case for the usage of year 
frequency data (see, for instance, Mélitz (2000, 24) position according to which “the move to 
the quarterly frequency may do little. If government expenditures (especially those on goods 
and services) really respond automatically to the cycle, no amount of institutional detail about 
taxes and transfers will account adequately for the automatic responses, any more at the 
quarterly than the annual frequency”). Still, we consider that since there is an unclear 
empirical support for the “automatic” response of fiscal policies in European Union it could 
be with an acceptable analytical price take into consideration such a data frequency.  All the 
values are expressed as percentage of GDP ensuring the scale comparability. The time span of 
the analysis is almost 7 years (2000:04-2007:03). 
 
Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics of the data. The budget deficit series are positively 
skewed (with the exception of Austria, Belgium, Netherlands, Spain and United Kingdom) 
and “flat” (platykurtic) relative to the normal (with the exception of Austria, Belgium and 
Greece data). 
 
Table 2 reports the correlation coefficients between the analyzed budget deficit series. There 
could be identified three groups of correlation coefficients: one with high values between 0.63 
and 0.73 for Austria, Belgium, Finland, France and Luxemburg, one with medium values of 
0.49 and 0.71 for United Kingdom, Ireland and Sweden and one with low/negative values for 
Spain, Greece and Italy and Denmark.  
 
3.1. The principal components results 
 
The results from the appliance of principal components analysis are reported in Table 3. The 
“header” describes the sample of observations, the method used to compute the dispersion 
matrix, and information about the number of components retained (in this case, all nine). 
 
The next section summarizes the eigenvalues, showing the values, the forward difference in 
the eigenvalues, the proportion of total variance explained, etc. Since there is performed a 
principal components analysis on a correlation matrix, the sum of the scaled variances for the 
fourteen variables is equal to 14. The first principal component accounts for 50% of the total 
variance, while the second contributes with 25% and the third with 11% of the total. Together 
the first three components generated 86% of the global variance. 
 
The second section describes the linear combination coefficients. We see that the first 
principal component (labelled “PC1”) is a roughly-equal linear combination of all 14 indices 
and could be interpreted as an “overall deficit”. The second principal component (labelled 
“PC2”) has negative loadings for the Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Italy and Luxemburg 
and positive loading for the rest of the countries suggesting the existence of at least two sub-
regional groups of fiscal families. 
The third section of the output displays the calculated correlation matrix with significant high 
levels of ordinary correlations. 
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3.2. The Johansen co-integration test 
 
The first task in performing a co-integration analysis is to check if the used series are 
integrated of order “1”. For this purpose, several unit root tests are employed (The 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller, the Phillips-Perron, and Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, and Shin 
tests are implemented and provide the same results) (Table 4). These tests significantly 
confirm at all levels (1%, 5% and 10%) that the budget deficit series are not stationary in 
levels. Complementary, the same tests (not reported here) had been done on first order 
differences confirming that the indices’ evolution could be described as an I(1) process  . 
 
Based on these results we proceed with the co-integration, applying the methodologies 
described previously. The analysis strategy consists in applying the Johansen procedure for 
each pair of countries selecting the lag length by using both Akaike's information criterion 
and Schwarz Bayesian Information Criterion. The involved length was established by taking 
into account the common results of these measures of the goodness of fit.  All the five 
deterministic trends cases were tested. In order to count for the effects of the “new” Stability 
Pact an exogenous dummy variable with “0” before and “1” after the second quarter of 2005 
was included in the tests. 
 
The Table 5 reports the results considering that the co-integration hypothesis is supported by 
both trace statistic and maximum eigenvalue statistics that confirms the existence of 1 co-
integration relation at a 5% level. Supplementary, the residuals for the co-integration 
equations had been tested in terms of stationarity and only the cases for which this stationarity 
was confirmed according to all the three mentioned stationarity tests had been retained. The 
statistic significance of the adjustment coefficients for the pairs of countries we detected co-
integration relations was used to accept / reject the hypothesis that one of the index dominates 
the existing common trend with the other one. For most of the pairs, there was not found a 
clear evidence for such domination.  
 
After a co-integration status was detected on individual pairs, for each of the deficits there 
was a re-run of the procedure on a multi-dimensional system with all the connections that was 
founded significant. The co-integration relations are reported in Table 6. It could be noticed 
the fact that all the co-integration coefficients are significant and overall the considered co-
integration relations seems to be stable for the analysis period.  
 
The main findings are resumed by Figure 1. This depicted the sub-groups of countries and the 
interlinkages between them (the groups are constructed based on the principle “all are co-
integrated with all”). A first group is composed by continental countries (Germany, Austria, 
Finland, Netherlands, Denmark, Greece, and Spain). A second group is formed by Ireland and 
United Kingdom. Interesting, France and Sweden are also integrated in this group. There also 
three countries (Italy, Luxemburg and Belgium) which are also co-integrated with the 
majority of the first group members (with the notable exceptions of no co-integration 
relationships with Austria, Belgium, Denmark and Greece). 
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4. Conclusions and further research 
 
In this paper, we examine the long-run relations between 14 European budget deficits data. 
Our results suggest that in terms of co-integration status there could be highlighted the 
existence of two sub-groups of countries with non-uniform degree of co-integration. 
 
Two main points emerge from the analysis performed. First, we find evidences that there are 
long-run connections between fiscal unbalanced evolutions at the level of old European Union 
members. These evidences are consistent with the alternative empirical studies. Second, 
according to these results there could be distinguishing between two main cases of association 
in the evolutions of the fiscal disequilibrium: the “continental” and respectively the “Anglo-
Saxon / Nordic plus France” ones. 
 
Of course, these results could be ample criticised since the underline analytical framework 
have a large number of weakness. Between these: 
 
(1) What kind of transmission mechanism? 
One of the major weaknesses of the proposed analysis consists in the fact that there is no 
associated formal explanation of the fiscal imbalances propagation among the considered 
countries. So that, there is no clear how the mentioned results could be fitted in a conceptual 
approach of the fiscal interlinkages issue. 
 
(2) What are the determinants? 
In the absence of a theoretical background there is no possible to count for the influence of a 
possible explanatory variables such as Maastricht Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact. 
 
(3) What about other analytical methods? 
 The principal component method is used as complementary analysis to the Johansen 
procedure and it tends to support its conclusions but nothing is mentioned about the 
approached used in other studies such as Dynamic Conditional Correlation (DCC) and 
Markov Switching ARCH-L more proper designed to deal in an adequate manner with co-
integration. Also, as for instance is mentioned in Alfonso (2005) the panel co-integration 
methodology has several advantages in comparison to the univariate analysis applied in the 
empirical literature and used also in this study. 
 
Also it could be noticed that the described situation could change due to the advance in 
deepening the CEE / Baltic fiscal systems and in their harmonization with old European 
Union ones, the consequences of the European constitution project failure and also as a result 
of the global financial instability. Thus, a further development of the proposed analysis should 
as a minimal requirement:  
1) Apply alternative methodologies for a proper study of co-integration status of budget 
deficits in an environment of financial and fiscal instability;  
2) Propose a sound conceptual model able to capture the determinants of the fiscal co-
integration and to explain the discriminant factors for the existence of the mentioned sub-
groups;  
3)  To estimate the consequences of the current financial volatility for the public revenues. 
Despite these caveats (and many others not specified) we consider that such type of analysis 
could highlight the long-run process of fiscal harmonization between the old European Union 
member countries as a part of the economic integration deepening process. 
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ANNEXES 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: The main characteristics of the budget deficits data 
 
 
 
 Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxemburg Netherlands Spain Sweden 
United 
Kingdom 
Mean -1.52 -0.50 2.39 3.97 -2.81 -2.48 -5.03 1.27 -3.07 1.98 -0.76 -0.51 0.37 1.22 
Median -1.42 -0.12 2.05 3.65 -2.68 -3.31 -4.81 1.17 -3.37 1.37 -0.50 0.26 -0.30 1.74 
Maximum 0.10 0.65 5.34 6.93 -1.23 1.31 -3.09 4.71 -0.86 6.17 2.00 6.46 2.85 3.75 
Minimum -3.91 -3.34 -0.23 2.18 -4.19 -4.22 -8.84 -0.95 -4.40 -1.27 -3.32 -9.44 -1.02 -1.62 
Std. Dev. 1.10 1.08 2.02 1.49 0.90 1.74 1.52 1.45 0.87 2.53 1.57 4.24 1.23 1.73 
Skewness -1.04 -1.60 0.20 0.49 0.13 0.98 -0.91 0.44 0.76 0.42 -0.06 -0.71 0.71 -0.23 
Kurtosis 3.37 4.27 1.49 2.00 1.88 2.54 3.15 2.85 2.88 1.80 1.95 2.65 1.95 1.70 
Jarque-Bera 5.38 14.38 2.94 2.35 1.59 4.87 4.07 0.98 2.85 2.60 1.35 2.56 3.77 2.30 
Probability 0.07 0.00 0.23 0.31 0.45 0.09 0.13 0.61 0.24 0.27 0.51 0.28 0.15 0.32 
Sum -43.97 -14.50 69.45 115.24 -81.63 -71.87 -145.92 36.88 -89.09 57.50 -22.12 -14.67 10.72 35.41 
Sum Sq. Dev. 33.99 32.70 114.59 62.14 22.86 84.88 64.34 58.51 21.23 178.56 68.73 503.58 42.33 84.08 
Observations 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
 
 
 
Table 2: Correlation coefficients of quarterly budget deficit series 
 
 
 
 Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxemburg Netherlands Spain Sweden 
United 
Kingdom 
Austria 1.00 0.69 -0.16 0.63 0.52 0.31 0.51 -0.10 0.43 0.73 0.24 -0.35 -0.02 0.09 
Belgium 0.69 1.00 -0.22 0.45 0.35 0.27 0.24 0.08 0.36 0.53 0.12 -0.28 -0.06 -0.01 
Denmark -0.16 -0.22 1.00 0.09 0.32 0.48 0.45 0.50 -0.03 -0.13 0.65 0.49 0.86 0.76 
Finland 0.63 0.45 0.09 1.00 0.90 0.79 0.63 0.39 0.76 0.92 0.74 -0.62 -0.06 0.62 
France 0.52 0.35 0.32 0.90 1.00 0.72 0.63 0.54 0.52 0.86 0.87 -0.54 0.05 0.73 
Germany 0.31 0.27 0.48 0.79 0.72 1.00 0.61 0.68 0.74 0.55 0.85 -0.25 0.32 0.84 
Greece 0.51 0.24 0.45 0.63 0.63 0.61 1.00 0.21 0.47 0.56 0.62 -0.01 0.46 0.51 
Ireland -0.10 0.08 0.50 0.39 0.54 0.68 0.21 1.00 0.35 0.20 0.77 -0.25 0.17 0.71 
Italy 0.43 0.36 -0.03 0.76 0.52 0.74 0.47 0.35 1.00 0.60 0.50 -0.50 -0.09 0.44 
Luxemburg 0.73 0.53 -0.13 0.92 0.86 0.55 0.56 0.20 0.60 1.00 0.56 -0.72 -0.25 0.38 
Netherlands 0.24 0.12 0.65 0.74 0.87 0.85 0.62 0.77 0.50 0.56 1.00 -0.28 0.35 0.93 
Spain -0.35 -0.28 0.49 -0.62 -0.54 -0.25 -0.01 -0.25 -0.50 -0.72 -0.28 1.00 0.76 -0.09 
Sweden -0.02 -0.06 0.86 -0.06 0.05 0.32 0.46 0.17 -0.09 -0.25 0.35 0.76 1.00 0.49 
United Kingdom 0.09 -0.01 0.76 0.62 0.73 0.84 0.51 0.71 0.44 0.38 0.93 -0.09 0.49 1.00 
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Table 3: Principal components analysis of the budget deficits 
 
 
 
Computed using: Ordinary correlations            
Extracting 14 of 14 possible components            
Eigenvalues: (Sum = 14, Average = 1)            
    Cumulative Cumulative          
Number Value Difference Proportion Value Proportion          
                              
1.000 6.922 3.423 0.494 6.922 0.494          
2.000 3.498 1.917 0.250 10.420 0.744          
3.000 1.581 0.869 0.113 12.001 0.857          
4.000 0.712 0.061 0.051 12.713 0.908          
5.000 0.651 0.396 0.047 13.363 0.955          
6.000 0.255 0.086 0.018 13.618 0.973          
7.000 0.169 0.075 0.012 13.787 0.985          
8.000 0.094 0.052 0.007 13.881 0.992          
9.000 0.042 0.018 0.003 13.923 0.995          
10.000 0.024 0.001 0.002 13.946 0.996          
11.000 0.022 0.005 0.002 13.969 0.998          
12.000 0.017 0.008 0.001 13.986 0.999          
13.000 0.009 0.004 0.001 13.995 1.000          
14.000 0.005 ---     0.000 14.000 1.000          
                              
               
Eigenvectors (loadings):              
Variable PC 1   PC 2   PC 3   PC 4   PC 5   PC 6   PC 7   PC 8   PC 9   PC 10   PC 11   PC 12   PC 13   PC 14   
                              
               
Austria 0.206 -0.258 0.472 0.004 0.142 0.156 0.768 0.107 0.005 -0.066 0.125 0.037 -0.008 0.037 
Belgium 0.155 -0.248 0.362 0.663 0.319 -0.053 -0.399 -0.185 -0.146 -0.117 0.096 0.014 -0.029 0.015 
Denmark 0.146 0.481 0.057 -0.055 0.150 0.068 0.086 -0.339 -0.202 -0.348 -0.194 0.093 0.568 0.247 
Finland 0.354 -0.154 0.008 -0.110 -0.085 0.197 -0.203 0.256 0.237 -0.249 -0.004 -0.714 0.195 0.143 
France 0.354 -0.045 -0.050 -0.240 0.318 0.022 -0.135 -0.089 0.461 -0.093 0.060 0.303 0.143 -0.589 
Germany 0.341 0.113 -0.067 0.224 -0.298 0.140 -0.061 0.621 -0.290 -0.175 -0.217 0.361 0.012 -0.158 
Greece 0.273 0.096 0.365 -0.328 -0.210 -0.711 -0.120 0.035 -0.222 0.002 0.240 -0.041 -0.014 -0.033 
Ireland 0.233 0.186 -0.410 0.424 0.229 -0.458 0.302 0.171 0.205 0.292 0.018 -0.146 0.162 0.079 
Italy 0.275 -0.143 -0.049 0.248 -0.714 0.028 0.100 -0.484 0.258 0.059 -0.004 0.104 0.068 0.007 
Luxemburg 0.306 -0.276 0.074 -0.250 0.139 0.082 -0.193 0.021 -0.008 0.566 -0.331 0.241 0.118 0.443 
Netherlands 0.345 0.176 -0.153 -0.078 0.151 -0.040 0.043 -0.171 0.097 -0.322 -0.181 0.045 -0.731 0.288 
United 
Kingdom -0.174 0.392 0.366 0.103 -0.086 0.058 -0.149 0.267 0.584 0.015 0.234 0.235 -0.006 0.340 
Spain 0.072 0.452 0.379 0.090 -0.023 0.144 0.019 -0.090 -0.003 0.397 -0.413 -0.328 -0.179 -0.377 
Sweden 0.305 0.271 -0.158 -0.035 0.036 0.402 -0.054 -0.084 -0.276 0.298 0.679 -0.029 -0.083 0.020 
                              
               
Ordinary correlations:             
 
Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxemburg Netherlands United Kingdom Spain Sweden 
Austria 1.000              
Belgium 0.691 1.000             
Denmark -0.158 -0.222 1.000            
Finland 0.626 0.454 0.088 1.000           
France 0.520 0.350 0.316 0.896 1.000          
Germany 0.312 0.267 0.477 0.791 0.716 1.000         
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Greece 0.513 0.240 0.448 0.627 0.632 0.612 1.000        
Ireland -0.096 0.082 0.505 0.393 0.540 0.676 0.212 1.000       
Italy 0.429 0.359 -0.032 0.757 0.516 0.745 0.472 0.346 1.000      
Luxemburg 0.730 0.530 -0.129 0.917 0.861 0.545 0.555 0.195 0.603 1.000     
Netherlands 0.236 0.125 0.653 0.740 0.874 0.847 0.624 0.770 0.504 0.564 1.000    
United 
Kingdom -0.350 -0.285 0.489 -0.619 -0.538 -0.250 -0.009 -0.250 -0.505 -0.724 -0.281 1.000   
Spain -0.018 -0.063 0.863 -0.063 0.055 0.325 0.460 0.174 -0.086 -0.250 0.350 0.755 1.000  
Sweden 0.086 -0.005 0.760 0.616 0.729 0.840 0.514 0.714 0.437 0.384 0.930 -0.090 0.495 1.000 
 
 
 
 
Table 4: Unit root tests for budget deficits 
 
 
 
 
ADF PP KPSS 
Austria -0.635693 -1.778833 0.869672 
Belgium -2.312359 -2.313734 0.366086 
Denmark -1.933882 -2.546872 0.785872 
Finland 0.191058 -0.867101 4.372407 
France -1.526999 -1.574816 2.187663 
Germany -2.041683 -2.271259 1.492133 
Greece -1.319081 -2.100976 0.946071 
Ireland -2.604207 -2.565583 1.949515 
Italy -0.220636 -1.753521 0.948248 
Luxemburg -0.490754 -1.927535 0.978770 
Netherlands -2.939341 -2.095233 1.794515 
Spain -1.573853 -1.675745 3.157598 
Sweden -2.653885 -2.186183 1.475573 
United Kingdom -1.018890 -1.235180 0.640207 
 
 
Notes:  
 
ADF, PP and KPSS are the Augmented Dickey-Fuller, the Phillips-Perron and the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-
Schmidt-Shin unit root tests, respectively. The lag length is chosen using the Modified Hannan-Quinn 
information criterion.  
 
The spectral estimation method is AR spectral-GLS detrended for the PP and KPSS tests. For the ADF and PP 
tests, the null hypothesis is the presence of a unit root, whereas for the KPSS tests, the null hypothesis is 
stationarity. 
 
For all the tests there is a constant and a linear trend as exogenous variables. The ADF critical values  for 1%,5% 
and 10% significance levels are -4.323979, -3.580623 and -3.225334, the PP critical values are -4.323979, -
3.580623and -3.225334, the  KPSS critical values are 0.216, 0146 and respectively 0.119.  
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Table 5: The pairs Johansen co-integration test 
 
 Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France Germany Greece Ireland Italy Luxemburg Netherlands Spain Sweden United Kingdom 
Austria  No No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes/No No 
Belgium   No Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No No Yes No No 
Denmark    Yes Yes/No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes No No 
Finland     No/Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes/No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
France      Yes No Yes No Yes/No Yes No Yes Yes 
Germany       Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Greece        No No No Yes Yes Yes/No No 
Ireland         No Yes/No No Yes Yes Yes 
Italy          No No Yes No No 
Luxemburg           Yes No No Yes 
Netherlands            Yes Yes Yes/No 
Spain             Yes No 
Sweden              Yes 
United 
Kingdom               
 
 
Table 6: The co-integration equations 
 
GREDEF(-1) 1.000000 SWEDEF(-1) 1.000000 
SPADEF(-1) -3.459386 FRADEF(-1) -2.986802 
 (0.14274)  (0.25529) 
 [-24.2355]  [-11.6997] 
DANDEF(-1) -1.057636 UKDEF(-1) -0.526759 
 (0.08869)  (0.18183) 
 [-11.9254]  [-2.89696] 
FINDEF(-1) -1.433974 IRLDEF(-1) 0.397196 
 (0.06241)  (0.13916) 
 [-22.9759]  [ 2.85426] 
AUSDEF(-1) 1.153520 @TREND(00Q4) 0.212532 
 (0.07168)  (0.08804) 
 [ 16.0928]  [ 2.41414] 
NETHEF(-1) 2.448402 C -13.37523 
 (0.10096) 
 [ 24.2523] 
GERDEF(-1) -0.064492 
 (0.04194) 
 [-1.53776] 
@TREND(00Q4) 0.550511 
C 9.810692 
 
 
Figure 1: The sub-groups of “fiscal families”  
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